Algeria and the Arab Spring
Opting for the Status Quo Rather than Experimentation
In spite of strikes and protest campaigns, until now there have been no
uprisings in Algeria comparable to those in other Arab states. The fact that a
large percentage of the population consists of young people who are unhappy with
the government is still not an adequate prerequisite for mass protest, writes
Sigrid Faath in her analysis
Since the beginning of the protests that led to changes of government in 2011
in Tunisia and Egypt, and eventually also in Libya, there has been speculation
both in Algeria and abroad about whether Algeria is an exception, whether the
government is implementing its own, Algerian-style changes, and whether the
country will continue to be spared mass protests against the regime in the
future.
According to comments made by the Algerian foreign minister Mourad Medelci in
December 2011, in comparison with some other Arab states that are experiencing
changes, many of them painful, Algeria really is an exception. He reminded
people that despite the violent conflicts of the 1990s Algeria has been
experiencing a period of relative political stability for almost twenty years
now.
However, Mourad Medelci correctly pointed out that Morocco could also be
described as an exception. Since the ousting of the Tunisian president Ben Ali
on 14th January 2011, neither Morocco nor Algeria have seen mass protests on a
national scale that were persistently directed against the state leadership and
the regime, or that threatened the existing order and political stability.
Reforms to ward off rebellion
In this, Algeria and Morocco are fundamentally different from the so-called
North African transition states of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.
Algeria as the exception to the rule:
Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci reminds his listeners that the country has been
experiencing a period of relative political stability for almost 20 years – in
spite of the violent conflicts of the 1990s But they also differ
from Middle Eastern countries like Yemen, Bahrain or Syria, where protests
against their respective regimes in 2011, stimulated by events in North Africa,
escalated and led to violent conflicts which were quelled by military
intervention (Bahrain) or the resignation of the president (Yemen), but without
resolution and the creation of political stability; or which – as in the case of
Syria – led to an ongoing and bloody confrontation between opponents of the
regime and the security forces.
The King of Morocco responded to developments in Tunisia and Egypt with the
swift introduction of far-reaching reforms in the spring of 2011 that also made
changes to the political order. In 2011 King Mohammed VI speeded up the process
of reform that he had been promoting since he acceded to the throne in 1999, a
process that has secured him respect and legitimacy among large swathes of the
Moroccan people.
The Algerian leadership, on the other hand, reacted to the protest movements
in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya by introducing a massive increase in subsidies, as
well as smaller political concessions such as new legislation on political
parties, associations and media.
Announcements were made about the fairer distribution of social housing or
the creation of new jobs, about material support for young unemployed people,
and wage increases. These took up the societal changes people were calling for,
as they had been formulated for years and repeatedly demanded in the form of
protests.
"Deaf and archaic rulers"
In a report in
Algérie-Focus in March 2012, however, the author
Kamal Benkoussa doubts that Algeria will escape a societal explosion, because
"the street is young" and those in power "deaf and archaic".
Lethargy and lack of trust in the political
leadership: Despite the widespread criticism of the prevailing policy among the
youth of Algeria, there has been no sustained resistance to the authoritarian
government of President Bouteflika Their concern, he says, is to
maintain the status quo; they are no longer getting through to the young people,
and state institutions have lost all legitimacy – especially with the young.
At the latest since the 1980s, when the repercussions of the oil crisis
created difficulties for the supplier country because it was no longer able to
fulfil the expectations it had created in its people, the relationship between
the Algerian people and the state, its institutions, and especially those in
office has been distant, even hostile.
Since the 1980s, in this increasingly aggravated socio-economic context,
corruption, cronyism and inefficient bureaucratic structures have had the effect
of increasingly delegitimizing the state institutions. The institutions and
those in office came to be seen more than ever as 'opponents'. Among the
Algerian people, trust in their country's state institutions is lacking across
all age groups; on the contrary, there is strong criticism of prevailing
governmental policy.
Widespread dissatisfaction
The problematic circumstances that worked in favour of the protests in
Tunisia or Egypt also exist in Algeria. Since 2004 there have been repeated
outbreaks of social protest on account of the lack of infrastructure, lack of
transparency in the allocation of social housing, unemployment, lack of water,
decreasing spending power, inappropriate actions by the security forces,
inefficiency and lack of neutrality in the administration, preferential
treatment or marginalization of population groups and regions, etc.
Taken the wind out of the opposition's
sails: Algeria's President Bouteflika reacted to the revolutions in the
neighbouring Maghreb states in February 2011 by lifting the state of emergency
that had been in place in his country for 19 years and announcing
reforms These protests are an indication of both the virulence of
the problems and the dissatisfaction felt by large sections of the population
with regard to the circumstances in which they live.
For many years now there has been a considerable readiness to go on strike
and to protest, and young people have also always played a large part in these
actions. Yet despite this, the political opposition was unsuccessful in its
calls for mass mobilization against the regime, even though in Algeria too there
were numerous incidences of self-immolation in protest against the dire social
situation. So a high proportion of young people dissatisfied with the government
and its politics is not in itself a sufficient precondition for mass
protest.
In both Morocco and Algeria, a combination of experiences, developments and
constellations specific to each country have contributed to the fact that no
protest movement equivalent to those in Tunisia or Egypt has arisen that could
force a transfer of power or even regime change. Algeria is therefore not the
only exception in North Africa. There are numerous reasons why this is the
case.
Shadows of the past
Firstly: the consequences of the unrest of October 1988, which led to
political opening, the end of one-party rule and pluralistic elections, which
worked in favour of the Islamists organized in the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS). The power struggle between the former political and military powers and
the Islamists who were laying claim to power was followed by a violent conflict
of many years' duration, which finally ended in a decisive phase of
reconciliation and pacification in 1999 under President Bouteflika. Many
Algerians are still affected by these events and by their personal experience of
violence.
Secondly: the generally bad image parties have among the population. They are
seen as representing the particular interests of those in party office and a
small elite. The internal party divisions and quarrels which have very often led
to party splits only reinforce these negative views.
Shortfalls in providing for the people:
"The repeated outbreaks of social protest since 2004 on account of the lack of
infrastructure, lack of transparency in the allocation of social housing,
unemployment, lack of water, decreasing spending power, inappropriate actions by
the security forces, are an indication of the virulence of the problems and the
dissatisfaction felt by large sections of the population about the circumstances
in which they live," writes Faath Thirdly: the splintering of the
opposition parties, the leadership quarrels that repeatedly lead to the
formation of splinter groups and new parties, and the lack of personalities with
the ability to mobilize large sectors of the population all have a weakening
effect not just on individual parties, but also on concerted action.
This was clearly apparent in the spring of 2011, when attempts by liberal
opposition parties such as, for example, the Rally for Culture and Democracy
(RCD) to focus protest potential against the state leadership and organise
regular mass demonstrations along the Tunisian or Egyptian model soon failed.
There is no coherent opposition movement in Algeria.
Fourthly: the lack of interest in politics, party political activity and
elections as a means of political participation, which is exhibited by many
Algerians eligible to vote as well as by large sections of the younger
generation, has been demonstrated by numerous opinion polls as well as by the
low voter turnout in elections. According to official figures the voter turnout
in the last legislative elections in 2007 was 35%; political observers believed
it to be considerably less.
Another important influential factor is that over the course of 2011 the
enforced transfer of power did not lead to an orderly, peaceful transition
process in either Tunisia or Egypt, or in Libya. The risks accompanying the
transition process with regard to internal security or to social harmony and the
future role of the Islamists are, for the individual citizen, extremely
high.
Fear of the collapse of order
The internal political conflicts between the different Islamist groups and
the spectrum of religious-reformist to secular groups in Tunisia are having a
sobering effect. They are paralysing the country's economic development,
exacerbating the people's socio-economic situation, and turning violence into a
means of political argument in Tunisia, which until 2011 Algerians regarded as a
peaceful holiday destination.
The example of Libya – where NATO intervened, armed clashes continue over who
should hold political power, and inter-ethnic conflicts are now erupting into
violence – is also not calculated to mobilize a majority of the population in
Algeria (or Morocco) to participate in mass protests with unpredictable
consequences.
Will the legislative elections in Algeria on 10th May 2012 be the start of a
fundamental change? This is not to be expected, as the relationship between
potential voters and parties has not improved since the last elections, nor has
interest in the elections or expectations of them risen. The political
engagement of the younger generation is very limited.
Fear of the collapse of order, recent violent conflicts within society,
foreign intervention and negative effects on the economy – all these
developments can be observed in other countries that have undergone enforced
changes of government, and they argue more for a decision to retain the status
quo, not a decision to embark on an experiment.
Sigrid Faath
© Qantara.de 2012
The political scientist Dr. Sigrid Faath is Associate Fellow of the
German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. She specializes in, among other
things, the domestic and foreign policy of the Maghreb states and the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
Translated from the German by Charlotte Collins
Editors: Arian Fariborz, Lewis Gropp/Qantara.de
http://en.qantara.de/wcsite.php?wc_c=18957&wc_id=19869
